Abstract. This paper is a study of observer-based proof techniques applied to the veri cation of a model of a real world embedded system, an aircraft landing gear. We present a formal description of these techniques taken from 5 and look at three ways of applying them, comparing veri cation of the composed system with two approaches to decompositional veri cation. The example illustrates that due to the tight i n teraction in a plant-controller setting there is often little to be gained by adopting a decompositional approach t o v eri cation. Nonetheless, two reasons are presented for separation between the controller and its environment a t the modelling stage. Hence the result of the study is that in cases similar to this one, it is most expedient t o prove system properties using the composed model derived from individual parts.
Introduction
A major application area for automatic veri cation is embedded systems where software controllers interact with a physical environment. Verifying safety and timeliness properties for such systems has recently attracted a lot of attention in the context of hybrid systems where models with both continuous and discrete elements are subject to study 4 . In this paper we explore an alternative methodology, namely analysis of real-time control programs in combination with discrete abstractions of their environment the plant.
As a formalism for this investigation we h a ve c hosen an abstraction of a synchronous program, a synchronous Input Output I O machine, as de ned by Halbwachs et.al. 5 . This formalism is typically used to provide the formal semantics for programming languages such a s Esterel and for de ning the criteria for accepting well-behaved programs. Here we use the formalism for modelling embedded systems; this gives us the possibility of using the associated veri cation technology in our case study. This approach has obvious bene ts. First, we use the Esterel development e n vironment and veri cation techniques for proving properties which can not be proved using the model of the control program alone. These are properties which depend on the tight i n teraction between the plant and the controller. Secondly, once the composed model of the embedded system has been proved to have its desired properties the conversion of the realtime program to C code or a circuit is a matter of routine translation provided within the Esterel environment. Thus, existing and well-understood veri cation techniques for discrete models can be applied in a new setting. The price to pay is the derivation of explicit models for the environment. In this paper we argue that this is a viable undertaking.
The plant model we use is based on the physically grounded models derived elsewhere 10 . It can also be seen as the discrete structure extracted from a hybrid model based on Delta IO machines currently under development 12 .
The veri cation technique we employ is the observer-based method given by Halbwachs et.al. 5 , where a safety property of an I O machine M is de ned in terms of another machine called a synchronous observer. The observer watches the inputs and outputs of M, and if they ever violate the safety property it emits an alarm signal. A restriction of the method is that only safety properties are expressible.
The observer-based technique can also be applied in a decompositional 3 way which has been suggested elsewhere as a means for reducing complexity of proofs 1, 7, 3, 2 . Supposing we have a system of two components, and some overall property w e wish to prove that the system satis es. Instead of composing the system and verifying the property directly, w e wish to carry out a smaller proof step involving an intermediate property on each of the components. Unfortunately it is not always clear how to obtain this intermediate property nor for that matter whether these new proofs will be easier. In this paper we study this problem in the context of a an aircraft landing gear controller adopted from a real-world application 10 . The method is interesting to study since for our class of embedded systems there is an obvious plant-controller breakdown of the components. Thus, we study whether this particular decomposition pays o during veri cation.
The example illustrates the use of an explicit model of the environment for proving safety properties which depend on the correct interaction between the plant and the controller. The plant model can be used in a one shot compositional veri cation of the embedded system, or alternatively for deriving the weakest observer leading to proofs of safety property in a decompositional framework. In the paper we explain, again in the context of this example, why both of these approaches are more appropriate than decompositional veri cation using ad hoc intermediate properties.
In the next section we present the formal de nition of an observer with other de nitions required for the rest of the paper. Section 3 describes a model of the aircraft landing gear in terms of synchronous I O machines, and compares di erent proofs of a safety property. Finally in section 4 we return to the theory, and consider how the automatic synthesis of an intermediate property can be carried out.
Earlier applications of the automata approach within control systems can be found in 11 . A more recent use of the observer based methodology within 3 Note that the term`compositional veri cation' is sometimes used for the approach we denote by decompositional in this paper. We shall use the term compositional veri cation when we refer to a one shot veri cation of a composed system. telecommunication is reported in 6 .
Preliminaries
In this section we present some basic notions adopted from the work of Halbwachs et.al. which are used in the rest of the paper. Central to the modelling approach that we adopt is the concept of non-symmetric communication. This is di erent from the communication mechanism in e.g. process algebras 8 in that it allows an observer to observe the behaviour of a system without modifying it. Another model with a similar property is dynamic transition systems 9 which uses changes in the value of state variables for representing dynamic behaviour. In this paper we use the syntax of signal event based I O machines the prime motivation being the use of existing automatic veri cation tools, Mauto and Autograph for the synchronous language Esterel which can be compiled to I O machines. We require our speci ed systems to be reactive, i.e. 8q 2 Q M ; 8i I M ; i 6 = ; 9 o; q 0 such that q; i; o; q 0 2 M Such an I O machine in response to a sequence i 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i n ; : : : of input events returns a sequence o 1 ; o 2 ; : : : ; o n ; : : : of output events, such that there exists a sequence q 0 ; q 1 ; : : : ; q n ; : : : of states with q 0 = q0 M and q n,1 ; i n ; o n ; q n 2 M for all n 1. In the veri cation approach based on I O machines a safety property is considered as a set of traces. A trace on a set of signals S is a nite or in nite sequence of events on S. A property P on S is a safety property i 2 P , 0 2 P for any nite pre x 0 of Central to the veri cation approach used here is the notion of observer.
Basic De nitions
De nition 4. Let P be a safety property o n S. Let be a alarm signal not in S. An observer of P is a machine Q P ; q 0 P ; S ; f g; P which is both deterministic and reactive with the following property. Let q be the state that P reaches after reading the possibly empty trace . Then for any e v ent e 2 2 S O P q ; e = ; if :e 2 P f g otherwise We further assume that all transitions with an f g output event lead to a distinguished state q in P . Note that such a machine returns a sequence of empty output events as long as it receives a sequence of input events belonging to the safety property P. Moreover, the q state is not reachable from the initial state as long as the input traces are in P. T h us, the observer machine can be used for veri cation purposes as follows:
An I O machine M satis es a safety property P i the composed machine M k P never outputs any e v ent containing .
Decompositional Veri cation
The above technique can of course be applied for verifying a program which in turn consists of a number of parallel modules. For verifying that M 1 k M 2 satis es the safety property P, one may construct the machine M = M 1 k M 2 and ensure that M k P emits only empty output events.
Halbwachs et.al. 5 , however, propose an additional method for decompositional veri cation which they suggest might be more e cient in some cases. The decompositional approach works as follows. Assume that we are interested in proving the safety property P in a system composed of modules M 1 and M 2 .
They suggest a two-step veri cation procedure which requires the additional notion of restriction.
For any X Q M , let g pre M X = fq j 8i8o8q 0 such that q; i; o; q 0 2 M ; q 0 2 Xg be the set of states having all their successors in X.
De nition 5. Let M be an I O machine and P an observer for a safety property P. Let M 0 = M k P . Then sink P is the set of states in M 0 leading inevitably to the violation of property P, and de ned as follows: sink P = X:g pre M 0 Q M f q g X where is the least xed point operator.
De nition 6. Let M be an I O machine and P an observer for a safety property P. Let Intuitively, the resulting machine has no traces with events in, neither has it any states from which all the outgoing transitions now pruned had events before the restriction. The two steps of decompositional veri cation can then described as follows. To prove that M 1 k M 2 satis es the property P on S = I M1 O M1 I M2 O M2 , nd a property P 0 on I M2 O M2 such that 1. M 2 satis es P 0 2. M 1 = 1 P 0 satis es P.
That is, nd a reasonable approximation to M 2 which has the necessary properties so that when composed with M 1 the required safety property is met by the combined system. An obvious application of this method is in the case of embedded systems. Then let M 1 correspond to our embedded software, M 2 correspond to its surrounding environment, and P 0 correspond to a relevant property of the environment. The proof then tells us that provided the environment of the software behaves as it should then the closed system has the required property. This decompositional technique will be worthwhile only if each of these two steps is`simpler' than the one shot approach o f v erifying the composed system. Our conjecture is that for a large class of embedded systems this is unlikely to be the case. The question is complicated by the fact that there is a potentially in nite number of possible intermediate properties P 0 that could be chosen. A crucial question is then: how t o c hose a suitable P 0 .
For example, assume we h a ve a property P 0 which is thought to be suitable.
If the second step above fails, then the cause of the failure may be in either of the two components the module M 1 or the abstraction of M 2 ; P 0 . If the property P 0 has been derived ad hoc then either M 1 or P 0 and ultimately M 2 3 Example: Aircraft Landing Gear
In this section we use a model of a real world system to illustrate and assess observer-based veri cation. The system we h a ve c hosen to model is that taken from studies of the landing gear system of the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen multirole combat aircraft. This system has been modelled using a number of di erent formalisms, at various levels of complexity 10 . The earlier work included models where the relation between the physical properties of the hydraulic subsystem and the landing gear actuators could be studied. This enabled the study of the timeliness properties which are not covered here.
The model of the plant used in this paper is an abstraction of the physical models su cient for the expression of a safety property. W e consider the plant a s being composed of two simple mechanical systems, a door and a gear, interacting with a software controller. The pilot can give a command for the gear to be extended or retracted. Extending the gear for example involves the door being opened, the gear being lowered, and then the door being closed again. The safety property which can be expresses in terms of synchronous observers is the property that the gear and door should never collide under operation.
Modelling
In this section we present various components of the system and discuss the composed model. To begin with a hybrid model of the plant was developed using the hybrid formalism of Delta IO machines 12 . The formalism represents a simple extension of discrete synchronous systems which allows the modelling of continuous processes within the framework of a standard synchronous language, in this case Esterel. In this paper we present the discrete structure of that model which contains su cient information for verifying the safety property w e are interested in.
The models are presented as I O machines. They were generated directly from the Esterel compiler, and drawn using the Autograph package. Transitions on the graphs are signal operator pairs concatenated by full stops. The ' ! ' operator represents that a signal is being output, a ' ? ' operator represents signal input, and a '' is an operator representing the absence of a signal from the input of a reaction.
The Plant For our purposes here, the 'plant' is considered to consist of everything beneath the software control system. This includes not just the physical system, but also the sensors, and the interface of the sensors with the controller. Figure 1 shows an I O machine representing the discrete fraction of the door model. This is half of the total plant model, the other half being the gear itself, which has very similar functionality but will not be depicted here. The gear is raised and lowered in the same way that the door is opened and closed. The plant model is given by the parallel composition of the door and the gear models.
The machine in gure 1 has four states, the double ringed one representing the initial state. The two states shown here on the left and right of the diagram The door can receive three inputs: odand cd are requests from the controller for the door to be opened and closed respectively, dq is a request from the controller for the door to report its state. As we can see from the transitions if the door is stationary in states OPEN or CLOSED and it receives a dq, it will report its current state with the outputs dro or dc, door open and closed. If the door is in motion, the dq signal is ignored. On the transition from OPENING to the the OPEN state the door emits a dro without prompting, and of course a dc for the corresponding CLOSING case. The signal d is a signal indicating the movement of the door. It is emitted spontaneously on an empty input whenever the position of the door is updated i.e. when the door moves.
So the operation of the door is essentially a cycle. It starts closed. A od will start it opening, once open a cd will start it closing again. At a n y stage its movement can be reversed by the appropriate command.
The Controller The controller is not depicted here because the state machine produced is too complicated to make easy sense of, consisting of 8 states and 48 transitions. The Esterel code for it is given instead in the Appendix.
The controller communicates with the plant via the ten control and sensor signals. In addition it receives two signals from the pilot, cmd up and cmd down representing commands to extend and retract the gear. It is assumed that the controller should allow the pilot to disrupt the process of extension or retraction of the gear at any stage. It was also intended that the controller should not simply assume knowledge of the position of gear and door, but must check, every time a command is issued.
The System A diagram of the composed system is shown in gure 2. This model has been automatically generated using the parallel composition of the plant and controller models. From the initial state at the top, a cmd down signal will start the door moving opening this can be seen on the graph as the transition !d . cmd up. Once the door is open the gear starts moving lowering and nally the door moves again closing and comes to rest. This is the progression down the left hand side of the diagram. At any stage if we receive a cmd up signal, this will move control to the right hand side which brings the gear up.
We can clearly see just from this diagram that our composed system 8 states, 28 transitions is simpler in terms of reachable states and transitions than either the plant model 16 states, 256 transitions or the controller 8 states, 48 transitions from which it is composed.
Compositional Veri cation
The property that we are interested in verifying is that the landing gear and the door will not collide. This property w e prove b y proving the stronger property that the door should always be open and stationary when the landing gear is in motion. This second property can be seen as two properties, that the door and gear are never moving at the same time, and that the door is always open when the gear is in motion. Notice that both properties, are properties of the composed system, and cannot hold over just the plant or controller.
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Ad Hoc Decompositional Veri cation
In this subsection we consider verifying the property using an ad hoc approach to nding our intermediate property P 0 . The problem of synthesising this property automatically is complex, and we consider it in section 4. Here we consider nding a suitable property b y using our intuitive understanding of the operation of the system. There are two ways in which we can go about searching for P 0 . Either we can look for a property P 0 that is a property of the plant, or we can look for a property P 0 that is a property of the controller. In fact we tried both here.
The property is, of course, expressed as an observer. Finding suitable observers was a far from trivial task. We started by building observers that expressed what we thought might be su cient conditions, and kept adding restrictions until we could make both steps of the proof hold. The resulting observers expressed much stronger properties than were necessary in the end. In the search for P 0 we w ere helped by the fact that we already knew that our composed system satis ed P. The task would have been much harder if we were trying to actually verify P for the rst time, in which case proof failures could have been caused by errors in the system models as well as de ciencies in P 0 .
Both our observers were larger than the observer of the system property. The controller observer had 4 states and 61 transitions, its two v eri cation steps involved machines of size 19 states, 151 transitions and 13 states 212 transitions. The plant observer had 26 states and 2676 transitions and had veri cation steps with machines of sizes 27 states, 402 transitions and 61 states, 5108 transitions. Clearly both of these decompositions produced two m uch larger proofs than the veri cation of the composed system.
Does Decomposition Pay O ?
The example considered here is small, but large enough to be illustrative. From the work presented here we can conclude, that for similar cases:
The composition of plant and controller can be smaller than either component.
It is di cult to nd an intermediate property suitable for decompositional proof by hand. Even when an intermediate property is found the two steps of the decompositional proof can involve larger constructions than the single proof of the composed system. We tentatively conclude that this was not a suitable situation to apply decompositional veri cation.
Part of the problem that we experienced in applying the technique of decomposition to this example was due to the di culty of nding a suitable intermediate property P 0 . The properties that we came up with in both cases were stronger than required. Ideally we w ould use the weakest possible P 0 . This would have the advantage that the two steps of the decompositional proof would provide necessary and su cient conditions for our overall property to be satis ed by the composed system.
Weakest Observers

Synthesis Method
Halbwachs et.al. propose a method for synthesis of the weakest property P 0 , and present a proof for the the following statement: if the property P 0 is arrived at in the proposed manner then it su ces to perform step 1 of the decompositional technique for proving the property P. T o put this statement more precisely we restate a few auxiliary de nitions.
Let tracesQ be the set of all nite traces = e 1 ; : : : ; e n such that q n,1 ; i n ; o n ; q n 2 M , i n o n = e n , and q n 2 Q. F or a trace = e 1 ; : : : ; e n ; : : : we de ne the projection of on a set of signals S 0 as the trace S 0 = e 1 S 0 ; : : : ; e n S 0 ; : : : . The projection of a set of traces T on a set S 0 is de ned as T S 0 = f S 0 j 2 Tg. Finally, i f T is a set of nite traces on S, then CT is de ned to be the set of traces on S which do not have a n y pre x in T. To prove that M 1 k M 2 satis es P denoted j = P, Halbwachs et.al. suggest the following method. Proposition 7. 5 Let P be an observer for P emitting on violation of P. Let T err = tracesQ M1 f q g and let P 0 = CT err S 2 . Then M 2 j = P 0 , M 1 k M 2 j = P This proposition provides a method for doing decompositional veri cation that avoids the need for iterating, because the bottom line of claim 7 is an`if and only if'. In other words if we generate the property in this way, then if P 0 is satis ed by M 2 the proof is successful, if it fails to be satis ed by M 2 then we know that one of the machines M 1 or M 2 is awed.
Although this proof is expressed in terms of traces, it can clearly be implemented in terms of observers. The property CT err S 2 can be expressed as an observer constructed from the synchronous product of M 1 and P , b y c hanging signals from outputs to inputs except and restricting the signals to those in S 2 . This observer can then be used to check the properties of M 2 in the usual way.
Discussion
In comparing the di erent proof approaches we are interested in the size, that is number of states and transitions, of the I O machines involved in the verication process. A decompositional approach might be considered worthwhile if it involves signi cantly smaller machines.
We have already observed that the composition of a plant and controller can result in a small machine. To see why we must consider the de nition of In the case of our synthesized observer P 0 , it is clear that it will be the same size as M 1 k P . Consequently the veri cation step on this machine which involves checking to see if P 0 k M 2 emits , will involve comparable sized machines to the compositional veri cation step which c hecks M 1 k M 2 k P for emissions. Not only is the last step comparable, the intermediate step it takes can also involve the unnecessary introduction of a large machine. Such a n P 0 synthesized as a property of the plant in our landing gear example has 29 states and 547 transitions.
The observer P 0 , as we have described it, is not of course the minimal weakest observer. We need to preserve any transitions in any path leading to an -state. However any other transitions could be removed. This minimised version of P 0 could possibly provide smaller veri cations. In practice, we found that there were no opportunities for such minimisations when the techniques were applied to our example, since every transition was in a path leading to an -state.
Summary
In this paper we h a ve considered the use of synchronous observers for veri cation of embedded systems. We h a ve considered a case where we h a ve a property P that can not be ascribed to the plant or the controller alone rather, it is a property of the composed system. To begin with, we note that starting to model the composed system is not to recommend for two reasons. First, to ensure correspondence with physical models, separate plant modelling is necessary. Second, checking the property of the composed system model does not give a n y hints as to what the controller should look like. Separate controller modelling leads to easier realisation of the control program code. Next, we have considered alternative veri cation strategies. In this case it seems clear that a decompositional veri cation of the plant and controller can lead to harder proofs than a direct veri cation of the composed system, due largely to the tight i n teraction between the plant and the controller. It may b e the case that alternative decompositions of the system into components which share fewer signals would be more fruitful. However such decompositions may not be a natural feature of the constructed hybrid models.
Finally a note on complexity of models. A signi cant problem being constantly attacked by the veri cation community is the state explosion problem. While e orts in this direction are essential for applications in the real world, we h o p e t o h a ve demonstrated in this paper that clever modelling can complement these e orts by k eeping the size of the system under analysis to a minimum.
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